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ESTATE OF CHAPPELLE v. SANDERS: DUE
DILIGENCE CONFUSION CONTINUES
Generally, courts have strictly adhered to the timeliness standard em-
bodied in statutes of limitations.' The purpose of a statute of limitations is
to require prosecution of an action within a reasonable time to prevent the
damage or loss of available evidence and to discourage delay in the bring-
ing of claims. In addition, requiring that suit be filed within a period of
limitations prevents unfairness to the defendant who should reasonably
expect at some point to be free from stale claims.2
Exceptions to compliance with statutes of limitations have been granted
by the courts of several states only when circumstances warrant departure
from the rules. Courts have authorized noncompliance in exceptional cases
by implementing the "discovery rule."3 The discovery rule provides that
the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff learns he
or she has a cause of action against the defendant.' Fraudulent conceal-
ment of a cause of action by a defendant is an integral part of the rule.'
I. See generally Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394 (1946), in which the
Supreme Court stated that "a statute of limitation is a significant part of the legal rules
which determine the outcome of a litigation." A statute of limitations has been defined as "a
designated period of time during which a cause of action must be brought or be forever
barred." Guebard v. Jabaay, 65 Ill. App. 3d 255, 257, 381 N.E.2d 1164, 1166 (1978).
2. Guebard, 65 Il1. App. 3d at 257, 260, 381 N.E.2d at 1166, 1168. See Holmberg, 327
U.S. at 396 (statutes of limitations determine whether or not plaintiff has slept on his rights;
if he has, then decree for plaintiff would be unfair to defendant); Railroad Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944) (it is against defendant's interest to be
forced to defend a claim when witnesses and evidence are no longer available).
3. The "discovery rule" has been defined as "[tlhat rule [which] provides that the limi-
tations period commences not when the last act giving rise to a cause of action has occurred
but when the plaintiff knew or should have known that he was 'injured.'" Guebard, 65 111.
App. 3d at 258, 381 N.E.2d at 1166. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS ch. 5, § 30, at 144-45
(4th ed. 1971).
4. See, e.g., Traer v. Clews, 115 U.S. 528 (1885) (if defendant acquired title to property
of a bankrupt estate by means of fraud, then the statute of limitations is tolled and purchaser
from trustee of bankrupt estate is not barred from bringing suit); International Ladies' Gar-
ment Workers Union v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Union's cause of action
against company for refusal to bargain over relocation not barred by statute of limitations
where company concealed reasons for relocation); Searl v. Earll, 221 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir.
1954) (if concealment constitutes fraud, statute of limitations will not begin to run until
plaintiff discovers fraud).
5. Fraudulent concealment is defined as nondisclosure of information which another
party is legally bound to disclose. Magee v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 92 U.S. 93, 98 (1875).
For such concealment to be fraudulent, there must clearly be an intent to deceive. Id. But
Estate of Chappelle v. Sanders
For example, courts, including the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, have unanimously held that a defendant who
fraudulently conceals the existence of a cause of action from a plaintiff is
barred from claiming the running of the period of limitations as a
defense.6
On the other hand, a majority of jurisdictions have held that the discov-
ery rule does not apply when the defendant's identity is concealed from the
plaintiff.7 Therefore, the running of the period of limitations is not tolled
in fraudulent concealment of identity cases.8 Following the example set by
see Note, Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. and Statutes of Limitations in Latent Injury
Litigation: An Equitable Expansion of the Discovery Rule, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 471 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary & Casualty Hosp., 396 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (hospital withheld records from son who was looking into father's death and to whom,
as his father's representative, physician-patient privilege would not apply); City of Burling-
ton v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 215 F. Supp. 497 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d 691 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (four year statute of limitations under Clayton Act is tolled if defendant fraudu-
lently conceals antitrust violations); P.H. Sheehy Co. v. Eastern Importing & Mfg. Co., 44
App. D.C. 107 (1915) (where defendant concealed from plaintiff that sardines he sold to
plaintiff were of inferior quality, statute of limitations does not begin to run until plaintiff
discovers breach of warranty); William J. Davis, Inc. v. Young, 412 A.2d 1187 (D.C. 1980)
(employer fraudulently concealed from an unsuspecting employee a right of action that em-
ployee had against employer for back wages); Roper v. Markle, 59 I1n. App. 3d 706, 375
N.E.2d 934 (1978) (plaintiffs cause of action for medical malpractice against doctor who
negligently performed hysterectomy, resulting in kidney infection requiring removal, did not
accrue until plaintiff learned that kidney infection was due to doctor's negligence). See gen-
erally 54 C.J.S. Limitations ofActions § 206(a)-(e) (1948).
7. As the court stated in Guebard, "[wie are not aware of any case in which the discov-
ery rule has been . . . extended or applied [to fraudulent concealment of identity cases] and
we are not convinced that the logic of the rule warrants such an extension by us." Guebard,
65 111. App. 3d at 258-59, 381 N.E.2d at 1167.
8. See, e.g., Staples v. Zoph, 9 Cal. App. 2d 369, 49 P.2d 1131 (1935) (in a libel action
where defendants fraudulently concealed their identities, statute of limitations is not tolled
because plaintiff knew of existence of cause of action and could have filed against a fictitious
defendant within limitations period); International Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 1765 v. United
Ass'n of Journeymen, Local 803, 341 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (defendant's
commission of intentional tort and subsequent concealment of his identity does not bar run-
ning of statute of limitations); Guebard, 65 111. App. 3d 255, 381 N.E.2d 1164 (1978) (statute
of limitations was not tolled in medical malpractice action where plaintiff had idea that
defendant, though never named by other defendants, may have had a hand in her injury and
where burden on defendant to defend himself after long lapse of time outweighed plaintiffs
hardship); Landers v. Evers, 107 Ind. App. 347, 24 N.E.2d 796 (1940) (where plaintiff was
involved in automobile accident at which defendant identified himself to plaintiffs husband
as Harold Evers instead of his true name, Howard Evers, statute of limitations is not tolled
because plaintiff knew of her injury and could have discerned she had filed suit against the
wrong person); UAW v. Wood, 337 Mich. 8, 59 N.W.2d 60 (1953) (if plaintiff sued one
defendant for libel and later found out defendant had been acting as agent for three other
people, withholding the other defendants' identities does not toll the period of limitations);
Morris v. Wise, 293 P.2d 547 (Okla. 1955) (concealment of driver's identity does not toll
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these jurisdictions, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Estate of
Chappelle v. Sanders,9 held that a defendant's concealment of his or her
identity does not toll the running of a statute of limitations if the plaintiff
has failed to use due diligence in attempting to ascertain the defendant's
identity.'o
Courts have justified not tolling statutes of limitations in concealed iden-
tity cases out of fairness to the defendant" and for the purpose of dissuad-
ing a plaintiff who is lazy' 2 or ignorant of the law.' 3 In Staples v. Zoph,
the California Court of Appeals held that a defendant's concealment of
her identity, in an action for libel, did not toll the running of the statute of
limitations. The Court based its decision on earlier California and Illinois
cases.' 5 The Staples court distinguished a California case relied on by the
plaintiff involving fraudulent concealment of a cause of action and stated
that "[c]oncealment of the identity of the party liable cannot be deemed
the same as concealment of a cause of action."' 6 The court distinguished
concealment of identity from concealment of a cause of action on the basis
that requiring the filing of a cause of action within the statute of limita-
tions in a concealment of identity case is not unfair to the plaintiff. Be-
statute of limitations where plaintiff was involved in collision with another automobile and
both occupants of other automobile denied having been driving at time of accident). See
generally 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitations ofActions § 148 (1970). But see St. Clair v. Bardstown
Transfer Line, Inc., 310 Ky. 776, 221 S.W.2d 679 (1949) (extending discovery rule to discov-
ery of a defendant's identity); see infra text accompanying notes 26-3 1.
9. 442 A.2d 157 (D.C. 1982).
10. Id at 159.
1I. See infra text accompanying note 21.
12. See infra text accompanying note 39.
13. See generally 51 Am. JUR. 2D Limitations ofActions § 146 (1970), stating that "the
mere fact that a person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue . . . does
not prevent the running of the statute . "
14. 9 Cal. App. 2d 369, 49 P.2d 1131 (1935).
15. See Gale v. McDaniel, 72 Cal. 334, 13 P. 871 (1887) (action for malicious destruc-
tion of stable and saloon barred because of expiration of statute of limitations); Proctor v.
Wells Bros. Co., 181 111. App. 468 (1913) (plaintiff served process on corporation with name
similar to true defendant and was barred from serving true defendant by running of statute
because plaintiff should have known of mistake and had notice that he had served wrong
defendant).
16. 9 Cal. App. 2d at 370, 49 P.2d at 1131. The Staples court distinguished Kimball v.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 220 Cal. 203, 30 P.2d 39 (1934), where the Pacific Gas & Electric
Company (PG&E) withheld information from its injured employee that the worker who had
caused him injury had, at the time of the accident, been employed by the General Electric
Company and not by PG&E. The Kimball court held that "the fraudulent concealment by
the defendant of the facts upon the existence of which the cause of action depends tolls the
statute, and such statute does not begin to run until the discovery by plaintiff or until by
reasonable diligence the plaintiff should have discovered the facts." Kimball, 220 Cal. at
215, 30 P.2d at 44.
(Vol. 32:966
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cause the plaintiff had knowledge of the injury to her character she could
have filed an action for libel against a "fictitious defendant" at any time
during the one year period of limitations.'
7
The Appellate Court of Illinois, in Guebard v. Jabaay, cited cases from
several jurisdictions as support for its holding that fraudulent concealment
of a defendant's identity in a medical malpractice suit does not bar the
running of the statute of limitations.' 9 Furthermore, the court noted that
the plaintiff had known prior to the running of the statute of limitations
that the unnamed defendant might have been the surgeon in charge of
plaintiff's first operation.2" Based on the facts of the case and on balancing
"the hardship on the plaintiff caused by the bar of [her] suit against the
increased burden of a defendant to obtain proof of his defense after the
passage of time,"'" the court refused to extend the discovery rule to cases
of fraudulent concealment of identity.
The Arizona Court of Appeals, in Lim v. Superior Court,22 consistent
with the holdings in California and Illinois, held that in a suit for defama-
tion, where the plaintiffs failed to search diligently for the identities of the
defamers, the period of limitations was not tolled. In Lim the real party in
interest, the defamed party, filed suit against Hughes Aircraft Company,
the source of a published defamatory letter. The defamed party initially
tried, within the one year period of limitations, to take the deposition of
two of the company's employees in order to ascertain the author or authors
of the defamatory letter. Because neither employee was furnished with a
witness and mileage fee, counsel for one of the employees objected to the
deposition. Though one of the employees was renoticed within the one
year statute of limitations, it was not until after the running of the statute
of limitations that the defamed party renoticed the other employee to take
his deposition.23 By the time the defamed party took the depositions and
discovered the identity of the defamer, the period of limitations had run
17. Staples, 9 Cal. App. 2d at 370, 49 P.2d at 1131.
18. 65 I11. App. 3d 255, 381 N.E.2d 1164 (1978).
19. Guebard, 65 Ill. App. 3d at 260, 381 N.E.2d at 1168 (citing Staples v. Zoph, 9 Cal.
App. 2d 369, 49 P.2d 1131 (1935); International Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 1765 v. United
Ass'n of Journeymen, Local 803, 341 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Landers v.
Evers, 107 Ind. App. 347, 24 N.E.2d 796 (1940); UAW v. Wood, 337 Mich. 8, 59 N.W.2d 60
(1953); Griffith v. Shannon, 284 S.W. 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926)).
20. Guebard, 65 IUl. App. 3d at 259, 381 N.E.2d at 1167. Though plaintiffs complaint
made reference only to Dr. Jabaay, to whom plaintiff had gone regarding a knee injury, one
of plaintiff's answers to defendant's interrogatories referred to a Dr. Angell as the possible
surgeon in plaintiff's June 22, 1971, operation.
21. Id.
22. 126 Ariz. 481, 616 P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1980).
23. Lim, 126 Ariz. at 483, 616 P.2d at 943.
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and the defendant then raised the statute of limitations as a defense to the
defamation suit. The court stated that plaintiff had failed to attempt dili-
gently to discover the defamer's identity or defamers' identities. 24 Based
on these facts, the court held that in an action for defamation, concealment
of a defendant's identity does not toll the statute of limitations.25
In contrast to the holdings of Staples, Guebard and Lim, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky in St. Clair v. Bardstown Transfer Line, Inc. ,26 held
that the concealment of a defendant's identity tolls the running of the pe-
riod of limitations. In a wrongful death claim filed by the decedent's wife,
the defendant, driver of the truck that struck the decedent, failed to com-
ply with a Kentucky statute requiring persons involved in automobile acci-
dents to give notice to the Kentucky State Police. 27 The court distinguished
this case from other concealment cases because of the existence of the stat-
ute and noted that the purpose of the statute was to provide plaintiffs with
compensation for injury.28 Because the defendant in St. Clair failed to file
an accident report, the plaintiff would have to "make a search of possibly
the entire Nation to ascertain who, if any one, was negligent in colliding
with and killing her husband upon the public streets of Louisville."
29
Plaintiff was unable, even through due diligence, to determine the identity
of the defendant.3" The court held that the defendant's failure to file an
accident report tolled the one year statute of limitations and that the pe-





26. 310 Ky. 776, 221 S.W.2d 679 (1949).
27. Ky. REV. STAT. § 189.580 (1942) (current version at Ky. REV. STAT. § 189.580
(1980)).
28. St. Clair, 310 Ky. at 779, 221 S.W.2d at 680-81.
29. Id at 780, 221 S.W.2d at 681.
30. Plaintiff's reply, in which she sought to avoid the defendant's statute of limitations
defense, stated that,
the defendant, through its agents, servants and employees, obstructed the prosecu-
tion of this action in that the defendant's agent, who was operating the said truck at
the time it ran over and killed the plaintiffs intestate, failed to stop the said vehicle
at the scene of the accident, but to the contrary fled therefrom and failed to report
the accident and concealed the identity of the owner of the said truck and the
operator thereof land] that by reason of the foregoing she did not have sufficient
information upon which to base a claim against the defendant for the death of her
decedent until after the expiration of the period of limitations.
Id at 778, 221 S.W.2d at 680 (quoting plaintiff's reply to defendant's statute of limitations
defense).
31. The St. Clair court stated:
In the circumstances defendant should not be allowed to superimpose upon plain-
tiff in an action like this one the labor and efforts to discover the concealed fact of
[Vol. 32:966
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In Estate of Chappelle v. Sanders,32 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals was faced with wrongful death and survival act claims filed after
the respective statutes of limitations had run. 33 The plaintiff, administra-
trix of the estate of Nan Chappelle, filed suit against two defendants fol-
lowing a two-car accident on June 17, 1976. One defendant, Theophilus
Sanders, Jr., the driver of one of the automobiles, gave decedent, a passen-
ger in the other car, a false name and address and left the scene before the
police arrived. The driver of decedent's car made note of defendant's li-
cense plate. On July 5, 1979, plaintiff filed wrongful death and survival act
claims against Sanders and the owner of the automobile involved in the
accident. At trial, the defendants successfully argued a motion for sum-
mary judgment based on the running of the statutes of limitations of both
claims.34 On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial
his ... identity when it is his statutory and primary duty to furnish that informa-
tion as directed by the statute imposing it.
Therefore, we conclude that the statutory requirement for notice, 189.580, KRS,
dispenses with any other efforts on the part of plaintiff to make the necessary dis-
covery as to who was responsible for negligently producing his death.
Id at 780, 221 S.W.2d at 681.
32. 442 A.2d 157 (D.C. 1982).
33. A wrongful death act is provided by the D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2702 (1981) which is
a section of the Negligence Causing Death statute. A survival of rights action is provided by
D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-101 (1981). In a wrongful death action in the District of Columbia,
the statute of limitations for bringing suit is one year. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2702 (1981).
Under the wrongful death act, a wrongful death action is one brought on behalf of a dece-
dent's beneficiaries when the death is due to the negligence of another individual. It is
usually brought by the beneficiaries themselves, though it may be brought for them by the
administrator of decedent's estate. Its purpose is to compensate the decedent's beneficiaries
for the loss of the decedent. I C.J.S. Abatement and Revival § 162 (1936). In contrast, the
survival of rights action statute, D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-101 (1981), sets no time limit within
which to bring the action. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301(8) (1981), which provides the statutory
limitation for bringing causes of action, states that "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically pro-
vided by law, actions for the following purposes may not be brought after the expiration of
the period specified below from the time the right to maintain the action accrues: . . . (8) for
which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed-3 years." Contrary to the common
law rule that a person's cause of action dies with him, legislatures have taken it upon them-
selves to pass survivor statutes allowing decedent's cause of action to remain alive. The
survival of rights statute preserves the cause of action vested in the decedent at' the time he
was injured by the wrongdoer, whether he died immediately or subsequently. The claim is
brought by the estate of the decedent on behalf of the decedent's estate and indirectly bene-
fits the decedent's beneficiaries. I C.J.S. Abatement and Revival § 144 (1936).
34. It is well established in the District of Columbia that "actions for personal injuries
accrue from the date of the wrong." Brewster v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 530 F.2d 1016,
1017 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Bair v. Bryant, 96 A.2d 508, 510 (D.C. 1953) (with regard to a tort,
statute of limitations begins to run on date of injury). The statute of limitations for the
plaintiff's survival action began to run on June 17, 1976, and expired on June 17, 1979. As
for the wrongful death claim, the period of limitations began to run on the date of Chap-
pelle's death, August 17, 1976, and expired on August 17, 1977. Because the plaintiff filed
19831
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court, holding that plaintiff's claims were not timely filed and that the de-
fendants' concealment of identities would not toll the running of the re-
spective statutes of limitations.35
The court in Chappelle chose to adopt the holdings in Staples,36
Guebard,37 and Lim .38 The court reasoned that plaintiff could have dis-
covered the defendants' identities from defendant's license plate number if
she had used due diligence.39 This same reason, however, was cited by the
Chappelle court to justify its rejection of the holding in St. Clair.4 ° Both
Chappelle and St. Clair are automobile accident cases involving defend-
ants who withheld their identities from the plaintiff in jurisdictions having
statutes requiring that accidents be reported to the authorities.4 The ma-
jor difference between the two cases is that in Chappelle the plaintiff had
defendant's license plate number and could easily have tracked down the
negligent driver of the vehicle. In St Clair, the plaintiff had no clue with
which to begin a search for the defendant.42 Though the fact patterns in
Chappelle and St. Clair are similar in many respects, the court in Chap-
pelle focused on the plaintiffs' abilities to identify the defendants and used
this as the basis for its finding that the holding in St. Clair was not
applicable. 3
The Chappelle court did not address the amount of diligence it would
require of a plaintiff having no clue as to the defendant's identity or
neither claim until July 5, 1979, the trial court found both claims to be barred by the statutes
of limitations.
35. Chappelle, 442 A.2d at 159.
36. See supra text accompanying note 14.
37. See supra text accompanying note 19.
38. See supra text accompanying note 22.
39. See generally Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. City of Burlington, 351 F.2d 762, 764
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (defense to claim of fraudulent concealment is that plaintiff knew of his
cause of action or by due diligence could have found out about it); Jackson v. American
Credit Bureau, Inc., 23 Ariz. App. 199, 203, 531 P.2d 932, 936 (1975) (statute of limitations
enacted to limit time within which action must be brought so that plaintiff will use due
diligence in bringing suit and not be neglectful of his rights); Weisberg v. Williams, Con-
nolly & Califano, 390 A.2d 992 (D.C. 1978) (while concealment of claim normally tolls the
statute of limitations, here plaintiffs could and should have known of existence of an attor-
ney malpractice claim against their attorneys as of 1965 when the government first defended
itself by claiming the statute of limitations had run on plaintiffs' Federal Tort Claims Act
claim, but plaintiffs failed to file against their attorneys until 1976).
40. Chappelle, 442 A.2d at 159.
41. Both Kentucky and the District of Columbia have statutes requiring the driver of a
vehicle involved in an accident to report the accident to the authorities. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 40-426 (1973) (current version at D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-410 (1981)); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 189.580 (1942) (current version at Ky. REV. STAT. § 189.580 (1981)).
42. St. Clair, 310 Ky. at 780, 221 S.W.2d at 681.
43. Chappelle, 442 A.2d at 158-59.
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whether plaintiffs inability to determine the identity of a defendant, after
exercising due diligence, would toll the period of limitations as in St.
Clair." The court's use of St. Clair seems to suggest that the court would
apply the discovery rule if, as in St. Clair, the plaintiff were totally unable
to discover the defendant's identity.4" Such precedent would require the
plaintiff to file a claim within the period of limitations which would begin
to run only after the identity of the defendant had been determined.
On the other hand, the court's reliance on Staples, Guebard, and Lim as
precedent seems to suggest that a plaintiff must file a claim within the ap-
plicable statutory period from the date the cause of action arises, even
though the defendant's identity may not be known. Following this filing,
plaintiff then has a duty to use due diligence to attempt to discover the
defendant's identity.46
The court's narrow holding in Chappelle does not make clear the course
the court will take in the future. Trial courts still have received no general
guidance as to the showing of diligence a plaintiff must make in a case
where defendant's identity was fraudulently concealed in order to toll the
statute of limitations. In particular, it is unclear whether the court will
require plaintiffs to file suit within the period of limitations even if their
diligent efforts to identify defendants are unsuccessful. The court's will-
ingness to consider St. Clair suggests that there may be cases in which the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals would find that fraudulent conceal-
ment of a defendant's identity did toll the running of the statute of
limitations.
M. Meredith Hayes
44. The court in Chappelle stated that "[iln the circumstances here we are inclined to
follow the rationale of those jurisdictions which have held generally that concealment of the
identity of liable parties, unlike the concealment of the existence of a claim, is insufficient to
toll the statute of limitations." Id. at 159.
45. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 17, 20-21, 24-25.
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